Media, Propaganda & Information Warfare

Social media has transformed the Israel-Iran conflict into a 24/7 global information battle where states, militias, bot networks, and ordinary citizens compete to shape perceptions. Unlike traditional media, social platforms enable direct communication between combatants and global audiences, bypassing editorial gatekeepers. The IDF live-tweets operations while IRGC-affiliated accounts post missile launch footage. Hezbollah's Telegram channels reach hundreds of thousands, while Israeli digital volunteers coordinate advocacy campaigns through dedicated apps.

The post-October 7 period saw the most intense social media information war in history. Within hours of the attack, competing narratives flooded every major platform, accompanied by an unprecedented volume of misinformation, recycled footage from other conflicts, AI-generated imagery, and deliberately manipulated content. Platform moderation systems were overwhelmed, and accusations of algorithmic bias flew from all sides.

Bot Networks and Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

Both sides of the conflict employ sophisticated bot networks and coordinated inauthentic behavior to amplify their narratives. Iran's most documented operation is "Endless Mayfly" (also known as "Newsroom"), identified by the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab. This operation creates fake news websites that mimic legitimate outlets, publishes fabricated articles, and uses networks of inauthentic social media accounts to share them. Stories typically target Western audiences with content designed to undermine support for Israel and US Middle East policy.

On the Israeli side, investigations by Stanford Internet Observatory and Meta's security team have identified networks of accounts originating in Israel that engage in coordinated advocacy campaigns. The Act.IL app, developed by the Israeli government in partnership with the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, directs users to specific social media posts and suggests pro-Israel responses, operating as a form of organized "digital diplomacy." While Act.IL uses real users rather than bots, critics argue it constitutes a form of coordinated inauthentic behavior that distorts online discourse.

Case Studies: Viral Misinformation

The "Destroyed Hospital" Video (October 2023): Within hours of the al-Ahli Arab Hospital explosion in Gaza, a video purporting to show the immediate aftermath went viral across all platforms. The footage was later confirmed to be from a different incident in Syria, years earlier. By the time fact-checkers debunked it, the video had been viewed over 100 million times and had already influenced diplomatic statements from multiple governments.

Fake Surrender Video (2024): During the Gaza ground operation, a deepfake video appeared showing what was claimed to be senior Hamas leaders surrendering to the IDF. The video used AI face-swapping technology applied to footage from an unrelated detention scenario. It was shared by several Israeli social media accounts before being identified as fabricated by Bellingcat and other OSINT investigators.

Recycled Missile Footage (April 2024): During Iran's "True Promise I" attack, multiple social media accounts shared videos claiming to show Iranian missiles striking Israeli targets. Analysis revealed that at least five widely-shared clips were actually footage from previous conflicts in Syria and Yemen, in some cases with added audio effects and edited overlays to make them appear current.

Iran operates one of the most sophisticated internet censorship regimes in the world, second only to China's Great Firewall in its scope and technical complexity. The government's approach to information control reflects a fundamental tension: the desire to isolate the domestic information space from foreign influence while maintaining enough connectivity for economic activity and regime-approved international communication. This tension has intensified dramatically during periods of conflict, when the government perceives the free flow of information as an existential security threat.

The cornerstone of Iran's internet control strategy is the National Information Network (NIN), also known as SHOMA, a project that has been under development since 2005. The goal is to create a fully sovereign internet infrastructure that can function independently of the global internet, allowing the government to sever international connections during crises while maintaining domestic services like banking, e-government, and state-approved communications. As of 2026, NIN is partially operational, with domestic content increasingly hosted on local servers and several popular international services replaced by government-approved alternatives.

Internet Shutdowns as a Weapon

Iran's most dramatic form of information control is the complete internet shutdown. The most significant occurred in November 2019, when the government severed all international internet connections for approximately one week following fuel price protests. During this blackout, security forces killed an estimated 1,500 protesters — a figure that only emerged weeks later when connectivity was restored and smuggled footage reached the outside world. This demonstrated the direct relationship between information control and the ability to use lethal force against civilians without immediate international scrutiny.

During the Mahsa Amini protests of September 2022, the government employed a more sophisticated approach: rather than a total shutdown, it selectively throttled internet speeds, blocked specific platforms, and disrupted mobile data connections while maintaining some fixed-line access. This targeted approach allowed essential economic services to continue while severely limiting protesters' ability to organize, livestream, or share footage of security force violence. The "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement nonetheless persisted, partly due to widespread VPN usage and Starlink satellite terminals that were smuggled into the country.

Platform Blocking and Alternatives

Iran has systematically blocked major international platforms and attempted to replace them with domestically controlled alternatives. Instagram, the last major Western social media platform accessible in Iran, was blocked in September 2022 during the Amini protests. WhatsApp and Telegram, both heavily used by Iranians, are officially blocked but widely accessed through VPNs. The government promotes domestic alternatives: Rubika (messaging), Aparat (video sharing), and Bale (business communication), which are subject to full government monitoring and content control.

The blocking of these platforms has created a two-tier information society in Iran. Technologically savvy citizens, predominantly younger and urban, navigate the censorship infrastructure using VPNs and access global information flows. Older, rural, and less tech-literate Iranians are largely confined to state media and government-controlled platforms, receiving a highly curated version of events. This information divide has significant implications for public opinion on the conflict with Israel, as different segments of the population receive fundamentally different accounts of the same events.

Starlink and the Circumvention Arms Race

The introduction of SpaceX's Starlink satellite internet service has created a new front in the battle over information access in Iran. Beginning in late 2022, Starlink terminals began appearing in Iran despite the absence of official service. These units were smuggled across borders or purchased through intermediaries, providing uncensorable internet access that bypasses Iran's entire terrestrial filtering infrastructure. The Iranian government has attempted to counter this through signal jamming, border seizures, and criminal penalties for Starlink possession.

The number of Starlink terminals operating in Iran remains unknown but is estimated to be in the tens of thousands as of 2026. Their impact is disproportionate to their numbers: a single terminal can provide internet access to an entire neighborhood, and during shutdowns they become the only connection to the outside world. Iranian dissident networks have established Starlink relay chains that share satellite connections across cities, and the technology has become a symbol of resistance against the regime's information monopoly.

Citizen Journalism and Diaspora Networks

Despite the censorship apparatus, Iranian citizen journalists have developed sophisticated methods for documenting events and transmitting information. During protests and conflict-related incidents, footage is captured on smartphones and transmitted through encrypted channels or physically smuggled out of the country on memory cards. The Iranian diaspora plays a crucial role in this ecosystem, with organizations like Iran International (based in London), IranWire, and numerous social media accounts operated by expatriate journalists amplifying domestic voices.

"Hasbara" is the Hebrew word for "explaining," and it refers to Israel's extensive public diplomacy and strategic communications apparatus. Unlike propaganda in the traditional sense, Hasbara operates through a combination of government programs, military communications, civil society organizations, and diaspora mobilization. The concept encompasses everything from the IDF Spokesperson's multilingual social media presence to organized volunteer programs that train civilians to advocate for Israel online. Critics view Hasbara as sophisticated state propaganda; supporters see it as a necessary response to what they perceive as systemic anti-Israel bias in international media.

The Hasbara ecosystem has grown dramatically since October 7, 2023. The Israeli government allocated emergency funds for international communications, the IDF Spokesperson's unit expanded its digital operations, and civilian volunteer organizations saw unprecedented sign-up rates. This expansion reflects a strategic recognition that military operations in Gaza and potential escalation with Iran required not just kinetic success but also maintaining international legitimacy — a goal that became increasingly difficult as civilian casualty figures mounted.

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit

The IDF Spokesperson's unit has evolved from a traditional military press office into one of the most sophisticated real-time social media operations in any military worldwide. During active operations, the unit publishes content simultaneously in Hebrew, English, Arabic, French, and Spanish across all major platforms. The unit's approach is characterized by speed — getting the Israeli military perspective out before competing narratives solidify — and visual evidence, regularly posting satellite imagery, drone footage, and intelligence materials to support its claims.

During the Gaza ground operation, the IDF Spokesperson became a primary news source, regularly holding press briefings with international media and providing escorted access to specific areas. This access model has been criticized by press freedom organizations as a form of information management, where journalists see only what the military chooses to show them. The IDF's Arabic-language spokesperson, who communicates directly with Palestinian and broader Arab audiences, has developed a significant following and represents a direct challenge to the narrative monopoly that groups like Hamas and Hezbollah maintained over Arabic-speaking audiences.

Act.IL and Coordinated Digital Advocacy

Act.IL is a smartphone application developed through a partnership between the Israeli government's Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the IDC Herzliya (now Reichman University). Launched in 2017, it operates as a "mission platform" that sends users push notifications directing them to specific social media posts or articles with suggested responses and talking points. Users earn points for completing "missions," gamifying the advocacy process. The app has been downloaded by tens of thousands of users, many of them diaspora Jews and Christian Zionist supporters.

The platform has been the subject of significant controversy. Meta (Facebook) removed a network of accounts linked to Act.IL campaigns in 2019 for "coordinated inauthentic behavior." Supporters argue that Act.IL simply mobilizes real people to share genuine opinions, distinguishing it from bot networks. Critics counter that organizing thousands of people to simultaneously flood a comment section or report content they disagree with creates an artificial impression of public opinion that distorts democratic discourse. The ethical line between civic engagement and information manipulation remains hotly debated.

"Volunteer Digital Soldiers"

Beyond Act.IL, Israel benefits from a broader network of what might be called "volunteer digital soldiers" — individuals and organizations that independently advocate for Israel online. These include college campus organizations like StandWithUs and Hillel International, evangelical Christian groups like Christians United for Israel (CUFI), and informal networks of diaspora volunteers. During the post-October 7 period, these networks were activated at unprecedented scale, with organizations hosting "mass tweeting" events and training sessions on effective online advocacy.

The Israeli government has also invested in training programs that bring international influencers and social media personalities on curated tours of Israel, including visits to sites affected by the October 7 attack. These "hasbara trips" have been both praised for providing firsthand exposure to Israeli perspectives and criticized as one-sided narrative management that excludes Palestinian voices and experiences.

Successes and Failures

Success — the October 7 Narrative: In the immediate aftermath of October 7, Israel's communication apparatus was remarkably effective. The graphic evidence of Hamas atrocities, including footage released by Hamas itself, generated enormous international sympathy. World leaders flew to Israel to express solidarity, and the initial military response in Gaza enjoyed broad Western public support. The "right to self-defense" framing dominated international discourse for weeks.

Failure — the Al-Ahli Hospital Explosion: On October 17, 2023, an explosion at the al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza killed hundreds. Hamas immediately blamed an Israeli airstrike. The IDF initially denied involvement, then presented evidence suggesting a misfired Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket was responsible. Multiple intelligence agencies later supported this assessment, but the narrative damage was already done. Protests erupted across the Arab world, Jordan cancelled a planned summit with President Biden, and the incident demonstrated how rapidly Israel could lose the narrative war even when evidence supported its position.

Ongoing Challenge — Casualty Figures: As the Gaza operation continued into 2024 and 2025, mounting civilian casualty figures reported by the Gaza Health Ministry (which the Israeli government disputes) created an increasingly difficult communications environment. Israel's messaging shifted from "right to self-defense" to more complex arguments about Hamas's use of human shields and the laws of armed conflict — nuances that proved difficult to communicate through social media formats optimized for emotional impact rather than legal analysis.

Western media coverage of the Israel-Iran conflict and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become one of the most contentious media issues of the 21st century. Every major Western outlet faces accusations of bias from both sides simultaneously — pro-Israeli advocates accuse them of anti-Israel framing, while pro-Palestinian advocates accuse them of whitewashing Israeli military actions. This dual criticism reflects the genuine difficulty of covering a conflict in which the two sides offer fundamentally incompatible narratives, and where editorial choices about language, framing, and source selection inevitably carry political implications.

Framing the Same Events Differently

The choice of framing language in Western media has been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate. When the BBC, CNN, New York Times, and Al Jazeera cover the same event, the differences in language, emphasis, and contextualization can be striking. These are not random variations but reflect deep editorial choices about how the conflict should be understood by their respective audiences.

Language Choices: The "Terrorist" Debate

Perhaps no editorial decision generates more controversy than the choice of whether to call armed groups "terrorists," "militants," "fighters," or "resistance movements." The BBC's policy of generally avoiding the word "terrorist" in its own reporting (while attributing it when quoting others) has made it a lightning rod for criticism from both sides. The Israeli government has publicly condemned the BBC for refusing to call Hamas terrorists, while Arab and Muslim groups have praised the policy as journalistically appropriate.

The New York Times uses "militants" as its default term for Hamas fighters, a choice that has drawn criticism from pro-Israel advocates who argue it sanitizes the group's actions. CNN uses "terrorists" more freely but has faced backlash from Arab-American organizations. Al Jazeera English, while maintaining professional standards that distinguish it from Al Jazeera Arabic, uses "resistance" language that Israeli advocates consider endorsement of violence. These linguistic choices are not trivial: research in communications studies consistently shows that the labels applied to armed actors significantly influence audience perceptions of conflict legitimacy.

Casualty Reporting Controversies

The sourcing of casualty figures has become one of the most contentious aspects of Western media coverage. The Gaza Health Ministry, which is administered by Hamas, provides the primary casualty figures cited by most international media. Israel has repeatedly challenged these figures as inflated or fabricated. However, multiple independent analyses, including by the United Nations and academic researchers, have found the Ministry's figures to be broadly consistent and reliable in aggregate, even if individual incident reports may be inaccurate. Western outlets navigate this by attributing figures to the Ministry and noting its Hamas affiliation, but critics argue that the repetition of these figures without sufficient scrutiny lends them undue authority.

On the Israeli side, casualty reporting has its own controversies. The IDF's claims about the ratio of combatants to civilians killed in Gaza have been disputed by independent analysts. Israel's initial claim that the October 7 death toll was 1,400 was later revised down to approximately 1,200, a correction that received relatively little media attention compared to the original figure.

Access Restrictions and Journalist Safety

The ability of journalists to independently report from conflict zones has been severely restricted. Israel barred international journalists from entering Gaza independently, offering only limited, escorted access through IDF-organized embeds. This meant that virtually all independent on-the-ground reporting from Gaza came from Palestinian journalists who were themselves living under bombardment. Press freedom organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF), condemned these access restrictions as undermining the ability of the press to independently verify claims from any side.

The human cost has been staggering. According to CPJ, more than 100 journalists and media workers were killed in the Gaza conflict between October 2023 and early 2025, making it the deadliest period for journalists in any conflict in modern history. Many of these were Palestinian journalists working for local outlets, but several international news organizations also suffered losses. Al Jazeera's bureau chief in Gaza, Wael Dahdouh, lost his wife, children, and grandchild in an Israeli strike, and continued reporting — a story that itself became a major media narrative illustrating the human cost of the conflict.

Campus Protests and Media Coverage

The wave of pro-Palestinian protests at universities across the United States and Europe in 2024 created a secondary media battleground. Coverage of these protests became almost as contentious as coverage of the conflict itself. Pro-Israel advocates accused media of romanticizing protesters and ignoring antisemitic incidents at encampments. Pro-Palestinian advocates accused media of focusing disproportionately on a small number of provocative incidents while ignoring the substantive demands of protesters and police violence against students.

The campus protest coverage illustrated a broader phenomenon: in the Israel-Iran conflict, the media itself becomes part of the story, and coverage of the coverage generates its own cycle of accusation and counter-accusation. This meta-level discourse has contributed to declining public trust in mainstream media institutions across the political spectrum, with surveys showing record-low confidence in media's ability to cover the conflict fairly.

The Israel-Iran conflict has become the definitive proving ground for both Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and AI-powered disinformation. On one hand, the OSINT revolution has given independent researchers unprecedented ability to verify or debunk claims from all parties using satellite imagery, social media analysis, and digital forensics. On the other hand, advances in artificial intelligence have made it possible to create increasingly convincing fake images, videos, and audio that can deceive even trained analysts. This arms race between verification and deception is reshaping how information warfare operates in modern conflicts.

The OSINT Revolution

Open Source Intelligence has democratized conflict analysis in ways that were unimaginable a decade ago. Organizations like Bellingcat, GeoConfirmed, and the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) have used publicly available satellite imagery, social media content, and geolocation techniques to independently verify or debunk military claims from both Israel and Iran. During the April 2024 Iranian missile attack on Israel, OSINT analysts were able to assess damage to Nevatim Air Base within hours using commercial satellite imagery from Planet Labs and Maxar Technologies, providing independent verification when both Israeli and Iranian official accounts proved unreliable.

Deepfakes and AI-Generated Disinformation

While OSINT provides tools for truth-seeking, AI advances are simultaneously empowering deception at unprecedented scale. The Israel-Iran conflict has seen some of the most consequential deployments of AI-generated disinformation in any military context. These range from crude manipulations that are easily detected to sophisticated productions that have deceived journalists, analysts, and policymakers.

Counter-Disinformation Efforts

A growing ecosystem of fact-checking organizations and counter-disinformation initiatives has emerged in response to the flood of false content surrounding the conflict. Twitter/X's Community Notes feature, despite its limitations, has provided crowd-sourced context on tens of thousands of misleading posts. Independent fact-checkers including AFP Fact Check, Reuters Fact Check, and regional organizations like Fatabyyano (Arabic) work to debunk viral claims. However, research consistently shows that corrections reach far fewer people than the original misinformation, and the emotional impact of false content often persists even after correction.

The future trajectory of this arms race favors deception. AI-generated content is becoming cheaper, faster, and more convincing with each new model generation. Detection tools struggle to keep pace, and the sheer volume of content generated during active conflict phases overwhelms verification capacity. This suggests that the information environment surrounding the Israel-Iran conflict will become progressively more polluted, making it increasingly difficult for ordinary citizens, journalists, and even policymakers to distinguish truth from fabrication.

Media and Press Freedom Organizations

• Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) — Journalist casualty tracking and press freedom reports
• Reporters Without Borders (RSF) — Press Freedom Index and conflict zone reporting
• Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism — Digital News Report (annual surveys on media trust)
• International Press Institute (IPI) — Media freedom monitoring in conflict zones

Disinformation and Information Operations Research

• Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) — "Endless Mayfly" and Iranian IO investigations
• Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO) — Coordinated inauthentic behavior studies
• Graphika — Social media network analysis and influence operation mapping
• NewsGuard — AI-generated news website identification and tracking
• Network Contagion Research Institute — TikTok algorithm and conflict content analysis
• Oxford Internet Institute — Computational propaganda research

OSINT and Verification

• Bellingcat — Open-source investigations and digital forensics
• GeoConfirmed — Geolocation verification of conflict footage
• Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) — Conflict monitoring and damage assessment
• InVID / WeVerify — Video and image verification tools
• Planet Labs / Maxar Technologies — Commercial satellite imagery providers

Censorship and Internet Freedom

• Freedom House — Freedom on the Net (annual Iran internet freedom assessment)
• Access Now — Internet shutdown tracking (#KeepItOn campaign)
• OONI (Open Observatory of Network Interference) — Iran censorship measurement
• Filterwatch — Iranian internet filtering monitoring
• Article 19 — Freedom of expression in Iran and the Middle East

Academic and Policy Analysis

• MIT Media Lab — Research on misinformation spread dynamics
• RAND Corporation — Information warfare and media manipulation studies
• Brookings Institution — Middle East media landscape analysis
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — Iran's media and censorship analysis
• Shorenstein Center, Harvard Kennedy School — Media and conflict coverage research